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Abstract
This paper presents first results from a collaborative research project which analyzes the
national transposition, enforcement and application of six European labor law Directives in
all 15 member states. Looking at the case of the EC's parental leave Directive (1996), it
draws conclusions about the domestic impact of European social policy standards.
It will interest practitioners as much as labor law experts that, in fact, adaptational pressure
was created in all 15 member states. Although the overall economic impact of the Directive
in terms of costs was rather modest, every single country had to change its rules. While
misfit was rather small in Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, the other
member states were confronted with significant adaptation pressure.
Political theorists may be surprised that our results cast doubts on the theoretical usefulness
of focusing too much on matches or mismatches between European policies and domestic
structures. We show that a very low degree of misfit may sometimes even be a problem
rather than a condition for success and that the existence of considerable adaptational
pressure may under certain conditions even be conducive to smooth implementation. In
addition, several member states not only eliminated the misfit created by the Directive, but
raised their domestic standards above the European minimum requirements.
Zusammenfassung
Dieses Papier stellt erste Ergebnisse eines Projektverbundes vor, der die rechtliche
Umsetzung, administrative Durchführung und praktische Anwendung von sechs
arbeitsrechtlichen EG-Richtlinien in allen 15 Mitgliedstaaten untersucht. Anhand der
Richtlinie zum Elternurlaub (1996) werden hier die Auswirkungen europäischer
Sozialstandards auf der nationalen Ebene behandelt.
Für Praktiker und Arbeitsrechtsexperten gleichermaßen interessant dürfte unser Befund sein,
dass die Richtlinie tatsächlich in allen Mitgliedstaaten Anpassungen nötig machte. Obwohl
die von der Richtlinie verursachten Kosten insgesamt eher gering waren, musste doch jedes
Land seine Regulierungen ändern. Während die erforderlichen Reformen in Deutschland,
Finnland, Frankreich, Portugal, Spanien und Schweden von eher begrenzter Tragweite waren,
sahen sich die übrigen Mitgliedstaaten mit beträchtlichem Anpassungsbedarf konfrontiert.
Theoretisch Interessierte werden feststellen, dass unsere Ergebnisse Zweifel daran erwecken,
ob die im Rahmen der Prognose des Anpassungserfolges bislang gängige Orientierung an der
Größe des verursachten Anpassungsbedarfes wirklich sinnvoll ist. Wir zeigen, dass sehr
kleiner "misfit" manchmal die erfolgreiche Anpassung sogar behindern kann, und dass hoherAnpassungsbedarf unter bestimmten Bedingungen größeren Erfolg verspricht. Darüber hinaus
haben mehrere Mitgliedstaaten im Zuge der Implementation nicht nur die notwendigen
Anpassungen vorgenommen, sondern ihre nationalen Standards über das von der Richtlinie
geforderte Maß hinaus verändert.
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For a long time, European Community studies was dominated by a bottom-up
perspective. The debate between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists in
essence revolved around the question of whether and to what extent nation states
were willing to transfer crucial decision-making competencies to the European
level. When scholarly attention turned away from "grand bargains" and macro-
level developments to an analysis of everyday decision-making, the underlying
analytical approach did not change fundamentally. When looking at the
interactions between supranational, national, subnational and societal actors in
European policy-making, the focus still lay on the relative influence of these actors
in bringing about European policy solutions.
It was only recently that scholars developed an interest in the effects of
Europeanization on domestic systems of governance. This top-down perspectivehas produced a number of studies dealing with the impact of membership in the
European Communities (now the European Union) on such phenomena as national
parliaments, party systems, state-society relationships or territorial state structures
(for example, Schmidt 1999; Falkner 2000; Börzel 2001; Mair 2001;
Maurer/Wessels 2001; Raunio/Hix 2001). In this context, scholars have also
developed a more narrow interest in the domestic impact of European policies, as
witnessed by the national implementation of European policy measures (Directives
and Regulations). Focusing mainly on environmental policy, a number of scholars
have pointed to the degree of fit or misfit between European rules and existing
institutional and regulatory traditions as one of the central factors determining
implementation performance. While some have stressed the importance of
institutional fit or misfit, i.e. the degree of compatibility or incompatibility
between European policies and national administrative structures and traditions
(Knill 2001; Knill/Lenschow 1999; 2001), others have directed attention to policy
fit or misfit, i.e. the match or mismatch between EC measures and domestic policy
instruments, standards and problem-solving approaches (Börzel 2000a; 2000b).
Still others have included both institutional and policy dimensions to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the match and mismatch between European
demands and domestic structures or legacies (Héritier et al. 1996; Duina 1997;
Duina 1999; Risse et al. 2001).
Notwithstanding these differences in detail, this strand of literature shares the view
that the compatibility or incompatibility between a given European policy measure
and the pre-existing national traditions in the member states tells us a lot about the
likeliness of implementation success or failure of that measure. The approach
ultimately rests on historical and/or sociological institutionalist assumptions about
the "stickiness" of deeply entrenched national policy traditions and administrative
routines, which poses great obstacles to reforms aiming to alter these arrangements
(see, for example, March/Olsen 1989; DiMaggio/Powell 1991; Thelen/Steinmo
1992; Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000).
Seen from this angle, European policies face deeply rooted institutional and
regulatory structures. If both fit together, that is if adaptational pressure is low,
implementation should be a smooth and unproblematic process easily
accomplished within the given time limits. If European policies do not match
existing traditions, however, implementation should be highly contested, leading
to considerable delays, and involving a high risk of total failure. The following
quotation provides a concise summary of this argument: "It is assumed that
implementation problems only occur if there is pressure for adaptation. If an EU
policy fits the problem solving approach, policy instruments and policy standards
adopted at the national level, there is no reason why the public administration
should resist implementation. The EU legislation can be easily absorbed into the
existing legal and administrative system. Only if the implementation of an EU
policy requires considerable legal and administrative changes imposing economic
and political costs on the public administration, implementation failure should be
expected" (Börzel 2000a: 225).
It seems that the preoccupation with matches and mismatches between European
policies and national structures has led to a certain neglect of other possible
factors that might influence the implementation of European policies. In a recent
edited book, Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso (2001) have
suggested a number of "mediating factors" which may lead to adaptation even inthe face of high levels of incompatibility. These factors are: a decision-making
structure with a small number of veto points or, alternatively, a consensus-oriented
decision-making culture which may be able to avoid stalemate even in systems
with multiple veto actors; the presence of supporting institutions; pressures exerted
by supportive interest groups; and processes of elite learning. The relevance of
most of these factors seems to be highly plausible, which is not only demonstrated
by the contributions assembled in the book (Green Cowles et al. 2001) but also by
other empirical studies that point to the importance of similar causal conditions
(Héritier et al. 2001). But do these factors really come into play only in cases of
high adaptational pressure? What about the areas of low and medium levels of
misfit which so far have been almost [2] totally neglected? And what other
properties of national systems might act to further or hinder timely and proper
implementation?
It is the aim of this paper to improve our understanding of implementation
processes in the EU context. It presents results from a collaborative research
project which analyzes, from a comparative perspective, the national transposition,
enforcement and application of six European labor law Directives in all 15
member states. The degree of changes required and the actual transposition of
European standards in the 15 domestic systems is discussed here, taking the
example of the 1996 parental leave Directive. On this basis, the paper draws
conclusions about the domestic impact of European social policy standards: Is the
parental leave agreement of relevance only because it is the first EU-level deal
between the European peak associations of labor and capital, and not as a piece of
social legislation that matters in terms of social convergence in Europe (as held by
earlier commentators)? [3] Furthermore, our paper discusses the relevance of the
misfit hypothesis (as specified in our operationalization [4]) and tries to outline a
number of additional causal conditions which have a bearing on implementation
performance.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the process
that led to the adoption of the parental leave Directive at the European level.
Second, each of the country case studies is summarized. Finally, we discuss the
insights into theoretical as well as empirical aspects derived from our study of the
parental leave Directive's implementation.
2 The Directive and its Background
The first Commission proposal for a Directive on parental leave and leave for
family reasons dates back as early as 1983 (COM [83] 686 final). On the basis of
the argument that the quite diverse national provisions were thought to hamper the
harmonious development of the Common Market, an approximation on the basis
of Article 100 EEC Treaty was suggested. The minimum standards suggested
were: three months of parental leave for either parent (to be taken up to the third
birthday of the child), and an unspecified number of days off for family reasons to
be decided by the individual member state. With regard to social insurance and
pay, leave for family reasons was to be treated as time off with pay. By contrast,
pay or indemnity for parental leave was only an option, to be met by public funds.
The Commission advocated an unequivocal non-transferability of these rights.
However, because of (mainly) British opposition and the unanimity requirement,
adoption was impossible. Finally, the draft was set aside for almost a decade.In 1993, the Belgian Council Presidency "tried to give social Europe back its
wings" (Belgian social minister Smet, quoted in Agence Europe November 25,
1993: 9). One of its initiatives consisted in drafting a new compromise proposal
on parental leave. During the Social Council's November session, the UK
reportedly tried in vain to obtain a derogation from the Directive, then restated its
opposition. [5] Fruitless negotiations continued until autumn 1994. Despite
consensus among eleven delegations in the last relevant Council debate on
September 22, 1994, deliberation was still not possible due to a British veto
(Ministerrat 1994; Hornung-Draus 1995).
This was the ideal situation for an application of the Maastricht Social Agreement,
which by then had already been in force for almost a year. It excluded the UK
from the social policy measures adopted by the other (then) eleven member states
and allowed for the adoption of Euro-collective agreements between the major
interest groups on social issues that could be implemented by the EC Council
Directives (for details on the Social Agreement, see Falkner 1998). Hence
consultation of labor and management on the issue of "reconciliation of
professional and family life" was instigated by the Commission on February 22,
1995. The Commission's consultation document outlined the importance of an
initiative in the light of men and women's changing employment roles. In addition
to national legal provisions, the Commission noted advances made on a voluntary
basis by the social partners in practically all of the member states and therefore
voiced the belief that the social partners should explore the widest possible range
of issues relating to reconciliation. Seventeen interest groups reportedly responded
within the six-week deadline of this first consultation procedure. According to
Commission sources (COM[96] 26 final, explanatory memorandum), the answers
revealed support for the promotion of equal opportunities as well as a consensus in
favor of Community action on the subject, at least in the form of a
recommendation. The general opinion was said to have been that the social
partners should play an active role in drawing up the fundamental principles and
then in implementing these through collective bargaining.
In fact, however, negotiation mandates were already being drawn up by the three
major cross-sectoral federations (UNICE, [6]CEEP [7]and ETUC [8] ) while the
first round of consultations was still taking place. This indicates that they were
keen to show that the Euro-corporatist procedures of the Maastricht Treaty could
actually be put into practice. On June 21, 1995, the Commission launched the
second round of consultations. Already some two weeks after the start of the
consultation, on July 5, 1995, CEEP, ETUC, and UNICE expressed their "wish to
prove that they are capable of reaching binding agreements in the framework of
negotiations" (Agence Europe July 13, 1995: 15; cf. European Industrial Relations
Review - EIRR 259: 30).
The collective negotiations were successfully concluded after only five (out of a
possible nine) months, on November 6, 1995. A draft framework agreement was
submitted to the respective decision-making bodies of the three institutions
(Agence Europe November 8, 1995: 15 and November 11, 1995: 12). With a view
to the implementation, the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP requested the Commission to
submit their framework agreement to the Council for a decision that would make
the requirements binding in the member states of the Union with the exception of
the UK. Soon after the formal signature of the agreement on December 14, 1995,the Commission accordingly proposed a draft Directive to the Council (on January
31, 1996; cf. Agence Europe February 1, 1996: 7). Reportedly, the draft was a
matter of controversy in the Social Affairs Council (cf. Agence Europe March 29,
1996: 8). For some delegations, the content of the framework agreement left too
much space for interpretation, making proper application in the member states a
difficult task. Others thought that the social partners had neglected powers of the
EC institutions by introducing a non-regression clause and a time limit for
implementation. Nevertheless, a political consensus was reached on March 29, [9]
and the Directive was formally adopted without debate on June 3, 1996. [10] The
Directive had to be incorporated into national law by June 3, 1998, with the
possibility of a maximum additional period of one year "if this is necessary to take
account of special difficulties or implementation by a collective agreement"
(Article 2 of the Directive). [11]
The parental leave agreement endows both male and female workers with an
individual right [12] to parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a
child. This is to enable them to take care of that child for at least three months. At
the end of the leave period, the workers have the right to return to the same job,
or, if this is not possible, to an "equivalent or similar job consistent with their
employment contract or employment relationship" (Clause 2.5). Acquired rights
have to be maintained as they stand until the end of the parental leave and to
apply again thereafter. The general considerations of the text reveal that parental
leave is seen as an important means of reconciling professional and family
responsibilities and promoting equal opportunities and treatment between men and
women. The "EC social partners" state that men should be encouraged to assume
an equal share of family responsibilities, for example by means of awareness
programs. However, it is crucial to stress that the agreement sets out only a few
minimum compulsory standards but leaves it to member states and national social
partners to establish the access conditions and modalities for applying the right to
parental leave and leave for urgent family reasons.
All the more thrilling is the question concerning the practical effects of the
Directive in the 15 member states, which have such different systems of labor law
and gender relations.
3 Implementing the Directive: Diverse Reactions to Common European
Standards
Austria
Austria already had a longstanding tradition of parental leave before it became a
member of the European Union. For example, the opportunity for the father to
take parental leave had been introduced in 1990. Since then, either parent could
take full-time leave until the child reached the age of 2, or part-time leave until the
child reached the age of 4. [13] During the period of leave, private sector
employees who met certain eligibility requirements received a benefit from the
unemployment insurance fund of approximately 12.35 euro per day; public
servants were entitled to approximately 25 percent of the wage paid in step 2 of
Service Category V (International Labour Office 1994: 290). In addition, adoptive
parents had the same rights to parental leave. Despite this rather well-developed
system, the implementation of the parental leave Directive has caused furtheramendments to the pre-existing legislation. [14]
First, the rights of adoptive parents have been extended. The previous rules have
caused problems regarding the adoption of children who were older than 1 year
and 9 months. For those children, the minimum requirement of the Directive of 3
months parental leave would not have been guaranteed as the leave in Austria was
only possible up to the child's second birthday. Therefore, the rules now allow
leave up to six months even if the child at the time of adoption is already between
18 months and 7 years old.
The second important issue has been the introduction of parental leave as an
individual right. Before the Directive was implemented, the father of the child
could only take leave of absence if the mother was entitled to the leave, but did not
take it. This meant that he could only care for the child if the mother left the leave
to him - there was no equal treatment of mother and father. In addition, if the
mother was, say, a student or a housewife, she had no right to take parental leave
and therefore the father was not entitled to take parental leave either. This had to
be changed in response to the Directive. It is interesting that, during the
negotiations between the European social partners, the Austrian and German trade
union representatives pressed for this individual right to be included in the
European regulations and finally succeeded with their demands. In this way,
Austrian trade unions have used the multi-level system to push through a reform
which at the national level might have met with more resistance.
Assessing the practical effect of the required adaptations, the progress made with
respect to adoptive parents has proved useful, but as to the individual right it must
be said that the take-up rates for fathers have not been affected very much in
practice (Interview A2: 1488-1499). It is still very unlikely that the father will take
parental leave, and even more so if the mother is at home anyway. The changes
taken as a whole cannot be considered very costly, either. Politically, however, the
introduction of the individual right may be judged as a remarkable qualitative step
towards equality between men and women.
Austria was late in transposing the Directive. It made use of the option to extend
the implementation period by one year, but nonetheless the amendments did not
come into force until January 1, 2000. The question arises as to why it was
necessary to extend the transposition period and why Austria still did not manage
to transpose in time despite the fact that the degree of misfit was rather low. This
may be explained with the help of the voluntary adaptations and additional
reforms carried out in the same reform process. Trade unions especially used the
transposition of the Directive as an occasion to press for more far-reaching
reforms to further the advantages for their members. Together with the adaptation
to the binding standards of the Directive, they succeeded, for instance, in
introducing more flexible notice periods for taking leave, which was favorable to
employees. In addition, the possibility was introduced to postpone parts of the
leave until the child is 7 years old. The interview partners clearly attributed the
incentive for this flexibilization of leave options to the recommendations of the
Directive (Interview A7: 379-389). Therefore, the implementation process -
although at first sight the misfit was not very great - has caused a broader
discussion between the government and the social partners and so has required
time.To sum up, the adaptations required by the Directive were important in a
sociopolitical respect, but rather small in their practical effects. Nevertheless,
transposition was delayed, which was mainly due to discussions between the
government and the social partners about voluntary reforms connected to the
transposition process. [15]
Denmark, Finland and Sweden
In the Scandinavian counties the main adaptations required by the Directive
concerned so-called leave for urgent family reasons (Clause 3 of the framework
agreement on parental leave). In Denmark and Sweden no further adaptations were
required at all. In Finland, only one additional slight change was necessary with
regard to an employee's return to work. In the pre-existing legislation in Finland,
the person on leave had the right to return to the same or to an equivalent job. The
Directive, however, prescribes that the person has to come back to the same job
and only if this is not possible may he or she be forced to accept an equivalent
one. This had to be adapted as well (Interview FIN3: 361-489). As far as parental
leave is concerned, well-developed systems which went beyond the Directive's
requirements were already in place in all three countries. There had even been pre-
existing rules as regards leave for urgent family reasons (e.g. in case of child
sickness), but these were not as comprehensive as the Directive prescribed.
Therefore, minor adaptations were necessary in all three countries.
Finland and Sweden transposed the missing rules correctly and in time. Besides
these compulsory adaptations there were no further changes associated with the
transposition processes. Even the recommended rules of the Directive already pre-
existed to a certain extent. [16] In addition, it seemed that, against the background
of already very well-established national systems, the national governments did
not see the need for any reforms which went beyond the Directive's compulsory
requirements. In sum, these cases do fit well with the common picture that small
adaptations can be dealt with by the member states without major transposition
problems.
The Danish case, though at first sight very similar, depicts a remarkable
particularity as regards the transposition instrument. In Denmark, the parental
leave Directive was transposed via the collective bargaining system, because leave
for urgent family reasons belongs to the areas regulated in Denmark via
autonomous social partner interaction without government interference. The social
partners in Denmark are eager to preserve their regulatory autonomy with regard
to working conditions. Therefore the rules governing urgent family leave were not
transposed via legislation, but by way of sectoral collective agreements. In
addition, the main social partner organizations concluded a national agreement
which intended to ensure that employees not covered by sectoral collective
agreements should nevertheless be granted the rights demanded by the Directive
(Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 25). While the European Treaty explicitly allows
member states to transpose European Directives by way of collective agreements,
[17] the European Court of Justice has defined strict criteria to judge whether such
implementation is in conformity with European law. In particular, collective
agreements have to ensure that all workers covered by a particular European
Directive are entitled to the rights conferred by the Directive. [18] There are other
cases where the European Commission has raised concerns that the coverageguaranteed by collective agreements was not sufficient and where Denmark finally
decided to depart from its tradition and introduced subsidiary legislation. [19] In
this case, the dialogue between the Danish government and the Commission is still
going on, but the odds are that it will end up with the same result - the need to
introduce supplementary legislation. If the European Commission does not accept
the way Denmark has implemented the Directive, this case will underline that
problems are very likely to occur if European Directives interfere with national
regulatory traditions, and especially with the autonomy of social partners.
Luxembourg
Before the European Directive had to be implemented, there was no parental leave
in Luxembourg in a narrow sense. Since 1988, employees could take a career
break and receive an allowance during that time. But these regulations did not
include a right to return to the same or a similar job, which is a very important
difference. If the employee applied for re-employment within a year after
maternity leave, the employer was obliged to give priority to the application,
provided that there was a vacancy and the employee on leave was qualified for it.
Yet still a parent using this career break always had to run the risk of not being re-
employed. Only civil servants were already able to take parental leave - though
unpaid - for a maximum of two years after maternity leave (International Labour
Office 1994: 360-361).
These regulations have been retained in Luxembourg even after the introduction
of the new parental leave rules, since the new parental leave scheme was
introduced in addition to the pre-existing rules. Now families can choose which
regulation they prefer: either the new kind of parental leave or the former scheme
of career breaks. Therefore the introduction of the parental leave can be regarded
as a novelty without pre-conditions, which is to say that the misfit for
Luxembourg on this issue was considerable. In addition, the pre-existing rules
regarding leave for urgent family reasons had also to be extended. Previously only
some collective agreements had covered this area. As a reaction to the Directive,
new legislation was introduced (Feyereisen 1999). On top of that, Luxembourg did
not simply introduce the minimum requirements of the Directive, but went far
beyond that. The introduction of the leave was seen (and justified) as a particular
employment measure with the aim of temporarily replacing the persons on leave
by unemployed people. Therefore, the leave period is longer than the Directive
prescribes - 6 instead of 3 months - and in addition people are encouraged to make
use of the leave, because it is very well paid, with employees receiving
approximately 1487 euro per month (Interview LUX11: 570-634).
Although the degree of misfit was considerable, Luxembourg managed to
transpose the Directive within the extended transposition period. The new parental
leave act came into force in March 1999. [20] This is even more surprising as
Luxembourg very often is among the countries which transpose with significant
delay. [21] This is mainly due to a combination of administrative overload and
political priorities. Luxembourg is a small country with limited administrative
capacities. Therefore, there are many problems encountered in coping with the
demands from Brussels on time. Under these conditions, the administrative action
is guided by the imperative of "what is most important is to be done first." As a
consequence, European measures pertaining to areas in which pre-existing nationalrules already exist, and which therefore necessitate rather small adaptations, are
treated with less priority than European Directives requiring the introduction of
completely new rules - like the parental leave Directive (Interview LUX1: 1000-
1034). It could then be argued that in the Luxembourg case transposition was in
time because the degree of changes required by the Directive was rather high.
Italy
Before the European Directive was implemented, regulations in Italy had provided
for so-called optional childcare leave of six months, which could be taken after
compulsory maternity leave. In principle, the mother was entitled to take this
leave, but the father could also make use of it in place of the mother or if he had
sole parental custody. [22] Adoptive parents had the same rights as natural
parents. The leave was also paid through a benefit of approximately 30 percent of
the employee's previous salary. These entitlements, however, were only
guaranteed for the mother or, in exceptional cases, to the father with sole custody
(International Labour Office 1994: 355). Nor was the right to return to a similar
job secured for fathers (Interview I10: 75-203). Hence opportunities to take
parental leave existed, even for fathers, but under rather difficult circumstances.
The interview partners' perception was that "the general idea of parental leave was
absent from Italian legislation" (Interview I5: 142-14). Especially since it was de
facto only a prolonged maternity leave, there was no equal role for the father.
Therefore, the changes induced by the transposition of the Directive can be
considered as an important qualitative step. The new legislation [23] secured the
individual right and equal treatment of the father as regards the return to the job.
In addition, the transposition process was used to voluntarily extend the optional
leave period from 6 to 10 months, and the government even introduced a bonus of
one month if the event of the father taking at least three months' leave in one
block. The practical consequences of these measures, however, will probably not
be drastic - at least in the short or medium term. Although it is too early to assess
the practical effects of the new law, it is not very likely that Italian families will be
quick to change their traditional model of family responsibilities. But at least the
possibilities for shared family responsibilities have been facilitated.
The transposition of the parental leave Directive in Italy was remarkably delayed.
The new law has only been in force since March 2000. In November 1999, an
infringement case was even referred to the European Court of Justice because of
non-transposition of the Directive. But it was finally dropped in June 2000 after
the adoption of law No. 53/2000 (Commission of the European Communities
2001: 31). The introduction of the new law caused fierce conflicts between
management and labor. In particular, there was strong opposition from the
employers' side (Interview I6: 294-327; Interview I9: 114-134). Interestingly, these
conflicts were not so much focused on the compulsory adaptations, though these in
turn have not been small. They were rather caused by the voluntary over-
implementation and the fact that the transposition was "part of a broader law,
which regards in general the relation between working time and social life and
especially focuses on sharing the familial responsibility between man and woman"
(Interview I5: 398-474).
In sum, there was remarkable misfit, and transposition was considerably late (until
an ECJ court action intervened), but the misfit alone was not the crucial point. Thetransposition was connected to a broader reform which at the time was a
controversial issue in the Italian political process.
Germany
The overall level of protection guaranteed by the pre-existing German Parental
Leave Act ("Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz") [24] was already well above the
requirements of the European parental leave Directive. Under the act, parents were
entitled to three years' parental leave during which a certain amount of allowance
was paid by the state. Nevertheless, the law did not conform fully to the Directive.
The right to take parental leave did not apply to employees whose partners were
staying at home because they were not employed. This system was therefore
inconsistent with the Directive, which guaranteed an individual right to parental
leave for all employees irrespective of the employment status of their partners.
The practical implications of this inconsistency between the European Directive
and the German legislation appear to be limited, since male employees (who will
typically have been affected by the clause because their wives tend to stay at home
in order to take care of the household and the raising of children) traditionally
have accounted for only two percent of all employees taking parental leave
(Vascovics/Rost 1999: 42). Since a single-income family will not be able to make
a living if the sole breadwinner takes parental leave and thus receives only state
parental leave allowance, which amounts to a maximum of 460 euro per month, it
is highly unlikely that a large number of newly entitled employees will make use
of their right. This explains why both trade unionists and employers'
representatives considered the degree of changes required by the Directive to be
low (Interview D3: 785-793; Interview D9: 111-156).
Despite the fact that the overall impact of the changes required by the Directive
was rather slight, the Directive was transposed no sooner than two and a half years
after the expiry of the implementation deadline. This seemingly surprising pattern
may be explained by the political unwillingness of the conservative-liberal
German government, which was in office until 1998, to adapt the German
legislation to the requirements of the European Directive. The exclusion of single-
income couples from the right to take parental leave was a logical consequence of
the male-breadwinner-oriented family model underlying the existing Parental
Leave Act (Interview D1: 30-72), which had been created in 1985, under the aegis
of the conservative-liberal Kohl government. According to that logic, if one of the
parents, typically the mother, was staying at home anyway, there was no need for
the father to take parental leave (Interview D3: 561-566). The Directive, with its
emphasis on the needs of working parents and the reconciliation of work and
family life, had a different starting point, and was therefore inconsistent with the
traditional German approach, even though this inconsistency manifested itself only
in a point of marginal practical relevance.
The conservative-liberal government was totally opposed to adapting the German
parental leave legislation to the Directive, since the latter was at odds with its
conservative preferences with regard to family policy (Interview D9: 143-150).
The government had already argued at the time the Directive was adopted at the
European level that it was not willing to change the German law in response to the
Directive (Ministerrat 1996). In 1998, when the European Commission issued aletter of formal notice, asking why Germany had not yet notified it of any
transposition measures (Bulletin EU 7/8-1998: section 1.8.1), German officials
again answered that there was no need for a change to the German legislation
(Interview D3: 538-635). It is interesting to note that, despite the insufficiency of
existing German legislation, the Commission seems to have been content with this
reply. At any rate, no further infringement steps have been taken against Germany
with regard to the parental leave Directive.
Following the adoption of the parental leave Directive in 1996, the Social
Democrats, who were part of the opposition at that time, introduced a
parliamentary motion (Bundestag 1996) in which they argued that the need to
transpose the parental leave Directive should be used to enact a fundamental
reform of the existing legislation, thereby transforming the male-breadwinner-
oriented parental leave scheme into a more gender-neutral one. The motion,
however, was voted down by the government coalition (Bundestag 1998: 22308).
Only after the new "Red-Green" government coalition between the Social
Democrats and the Green Party had assumed power in October 1998 was
transposition of the Directive accomplished by a fundamental overhaul of the
Parental Leave Act, which was adopted on July 7, 2000 and came into force on
January 1, 2001. [25] The reform was based on the proposals contained in the
1996 parliamentary motion. Thus, the revised legislation not only extended the
right to take parental leave to single-income couples, as necessitated by the
Directive, but even went far beyond the minimum requirements of the Directive,
thus reflecting some of the non-binding recommendations laid down in the
European measure. For example, the reform introduced a legal right to work part-
time during parental leave and allowed parents to take parental leave
simultaneously.
In sum, the German case shows that the implementation of measures with little
economic impact may give rise to considerable delays in transposition if they call
for qualitative changes to an existing regulatory system which are at odds with the
peculiar political agenda of the government of the day. Partisan composition of
government also seems to be crucial for the fate of soft-law provisions enshrined
in European Directives. In the German case, some of these non-binding
recommendations were indeed taken into account, but only because they went well
with the political aspirations of the incoming left-wing government.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, it was not until 1990 that a statutory parental leave scheme was
introduced at all. Moreover, the 1990 act [26] provided for comparatively modest
rights. Employees were entitled to thirteen weeks (or three months) unpaid
parental leave, which had to be taken on a part-time basis. Thus, employees could
not take full-time leave to take care of a child, but were only entitled to reduce
their weekly working time to 20 hours. The length of the leave was determined by
the previous working time. It amounted to 13 times the hours of a normal working
week. Thus, employees whose normal working time per week had been 40 hours
were entitled to reduce their hours to 20 hours for 26 weeks. While it would not
have been contrary to the Directive to provide for part-time leave only, the
obvious downside of the pre-existing Dutch parental leave scheme was that
employees whose weekly working time was below 20 hours were not entitled toparental leave at all (Interview NL4: 60-76). Such an exclusion of part-time
workers was not in line with the Directive, because Clause 1 of the framework
agreement stipulated: "This agreement applies to all workers, men and women,
who have an employment contract or employment relationship."
The need to extend coverage of the parental leave scheme to part-time workers
would seem to be an important step, especially in the Netherlands, which has the
highest proportion of part-time workers in Europe. In 1995, about 35 percent of all
Dutch employees were working on a part-time basis (Visser 1999: 286). [27]
Thus, the degree of changes required by the Directive appears to be considerable.
The actual significance of these changes, however, is greatly reduced by the fact
that a national review process of the 1990 act was already under way when the
Directive was passed in 1996, and the reform proposals issued by the government
as a result of that review already provided for an extension of the parental leave
scheme to all employees (Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 68). Hence, the implementation
of the Directive did not pose any major problems for the Dutch government. The
revised parental leave legislation was passed on June 25, 1997, and came into
operation on July 1, 1997. [28] While the soft-law provisions in the Directive in
general did not play an important role, trade unions successfully lobbied for the
incorporation of the Directive's recommendation that employees should be able to
take parental leave until the child's eighth birthday. Previously, the age limit had
been four years, and the initial government bill had provided for six years. Under
union pressure, the bill was amended during the parliamentary process in order to
raise the age limit to eight years (Interview NL4: 315-326; Interview NL10: 176-
179).
The implementation of the parental leave Directive in the Netherlands
demonstrates that an analysis of the "fit" or "misfit" between European
requirements and pre-existing national policies has to take into account the
possibility that the existing regulatory system might be a moving target, with
ongoing national reform processes pushing a country's initially mismatching
regulations towards the standards set at the European level.
United Kingdom
In the UK, the parental leave Directive necessitated the introduction of completely
new legislation. Prior to the implementation of the parental leave Directive,
employees did not have any legal entitlement to parental leave. In addition, this
lack of statutory provision was not counterbalanced to a significant degree by
equivalent entitlements provided by collective agreements or company practice.
Thus, the UK government estimated that only about a quarter of all eligible
employees already had some comparable entitlement to leave provided by their
employer (DTI 1999: 5-6). The actual costs to employers of introducing these new
rights were tempered by the fact that the Directive did not require member states
to provide any payment during parental leave. Hence, employers mainly had to
cope with the costs resulting from temporarily replacing parental leavers.
Altogether, the government estimated that the introduction of the new parental
leave scheme would burden business with additional annual costs of 42 million
pounds or around 69 million euro (DTI 1999: 2), which is relatively low compared
to the effects in the UK of the European working time Directive or theintroduction of a national minimum wage. [29] Despite the modest impact in
quantitative terms, the imposition of new legal rights for employees was a
considerable qualitative innovation, given the UK's liberal, intervention-free
tradition in employment regulation, which was reinforced by the deregulation
policy of the Thatcher and Major governments (Edwards et al. 1999: 4-15).
In light of the significant adaptational pressure, the way the Directive was
implemented in the UK conforms only partly to the conventional misfit-centered
view of implementation. Unlike its conservative predecessors who had vetoed the
draft Directive in the Council of Ministers on several occasions during the
European decision-making process (see above) and who had chosen to opt out of
the European Treaty's social chapter, the Labour government which had assumed
power in May 1997 was firmly committed to implementing the Directive. Blair's
more positive stance towards European social regulations was made clear when he
ended the British opt-out and agreed to implement the Directives adopted without
the UK. As a result of the government's supportive attitude, the Directive could be
incorporated into UK law within the implementation deadline. [30] This timely
transposition, however, was greatly facilitated by the extremely small number of
veto points which, under the British "Westminster model", would be able to stop a
government from realizing its will (Tsebelis 1995; Lijphart 1999: 9-21). What is
more, the virtual lack of any veto points outside of government itself is
complemented by a very far-reaching reliance on delegated legislation, at least in
the implementation of European Directives in the form of Regulations (Drewry
1995: 457). Although parliamentary influence is marginal in both cases, the
process of enacting Regulations is much faster than the one Acts of Parliament
have to go through (Interview GB7: 356-371, see also Butt Philipp/Baron 1988:
649-650).
The way in which the Directive was implemented, and the conflicts surrounding
the process, are more amenable to a misfit-oriented view. As a result of strong
employer pressure, but also because of its own policy of avoiding placing
unnecessary burdens on business, the government chose a very minimalist route to
implementation. Thus, almost all available exemption and derogation options were
used, and most soft-law provisions were disregarded. What is more, the
government introduced a "cut-off date" which excluded parents whose children
were born before the date on which the implementation legislation came into effect
(Regulation 13 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations etc. 1999).
This cut-off date, which was in response to demands from employers'
organizations, especially those representing small and medium-sized enterprises
(Interview GB2: 184-195, 531-552), was against the terms of the Directive, and
Britain's national trade union confederation, the TUC, therefore brought a case
against the government to the High Court in London. This case received
considerable media attention because the TUC was legally represented in court by
Cherie Blair, the Prime Minister's wife, who was herself about to have a baby at
the time of the Court hearing (Interview GB6: 270-277). The case subsequently
was referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. However,
the British judges had already argued that the case was likely to prevail in the
European Court of Justice (Hall 2000). A few days before the case would have
been heard before the ECJ, the government agreed to remedy the matter and the
TUC withdrew its challenge (TUC 2001). In the meantime, the legislation has
been amended so as to repeal the cut-off date. [31]In sum, the UK's implementation of the parental leave Directive partly confirms
the conventional view that high adaptational pressure leads to implementation
problems. What is overlooked by such an interpretation, however, is the favorable
stance of the government toward implementing the Directive and its ability to push
through the largest part of the required legislative reforms within the given
deadline. In addition, the importance of pressure groups acting as watchdogs and
the role of national and European court powers in enforcing European standards
are highlighted by the case.
Ireland
Implementation of the parental leave Directive in Ireland in almost all respects
parallels the British story. In Ireland, as in the UK, the Directive necessitated the
introduction of completely new legislation. Prior to the Directive, no statutory
parental leave scheme had existed. Thus, the degree of adaptation required was
"100 percent", as one interviewee aptly put it (Interview IRL1: 215). Similarly to
the UK, the actual costs of implementing the Directive were not excessive, but
still significant, with employers mainly having to cope with replacement costs,
while the total burden on business was moderated by the lack of any requirement
to provide for payment during parental leave (Interview IRL6: 288-302). The
introduction of a statutory right for mothers and fathers to take parental leave was
nevertheless a huge step for Ireland given the voluntarist tradition of Irish
employment regulation, resulting in a generally low level of labor market
regulation (Prondzynski/Richards 1994: 10; Prondzynski 1999: 56).
Like its British counterpart, the Irish government was firmly committed to
implementing the European Directive. This time, however, it was not party politics
that mattered, because the government supported the Directive even though it was
made up of a conservative-liberal coalition between Fianna Fáil and the Liberal
Democrats. However, the implementation of the parental leave Directive and a
number of other "family-friendly" measures had been agreed between the social
partners and the government in the tripartite "Partnership 2000" agreement
(Interview IRL6: 312-318). Since national social partnership, which has
considerably intensified during the last 15 years, is backed by all major political
parties in Ireland (O'Kelly 2000: 351), it comes as no surprise that the FF-LD
government fully supported the transposition of the Directive. As a consequence,
implementing the Directive was altogether a rather smooth process and could be
accomplished without exceeding the deadline. All that was needed was a six
months' extension of the transposition period, which, in accordance with Article 2
of the Directive, was granted by the Commission (Interview IRL6: 243-249, 616-
625). [32] This is all the more remarkable since deficient administrative capacities
in Ireland often lead to delays in implementation.
In substantive terms, the Irish government chose a minimalist way of transposing
the Directive, making use of most of the available exemptions and ignoring almost
all the soft-law provisions. The only instance of over-implementation was on the
issue of leave for urgent family reasons. While the Directive only stipulates that
employees must be granted a few days off work without payment to care for
family members who have suddenly become ill or have had an accident (Clause 3
of the framework agreement), the Irish legislation requires employers to maintainremuneration during leave for urgent family reasons, which, however, is restricted
to three days per year (Section 13 of the Parental Leave Act, 1998). In striking
similarity to the UK government, the Irish government decided to introduce a cut-
off date excluding parents whose children were born before June 3, 1996, i.e. the
date on which the Directive was adopted at the European level. As in the UK, this
was a reaction to the pressure from employers to minimize the initial costs of
adaptation to the Directive. It was only after the European Commission had
initiated infringement proceedings that the Irish government agreed to repeal the
cut-off date and to extend the legislation to all parents (Interview IRL6: 232-258).
[33]
The Irish case again demonstrates that it is perfectly possible for member states to
implement Directives which confront them with considerable adaptational pressure
in a surprisingly fast and altogether fairly smooth way. However, sometimes
concessions seem necessary to accommodate strong business opposition. Thus,
both the Irish and the UK governments initially gave in to business pressure
through the introduction of a cut-off date which excluded certain parents from
parental leave entitlements. They both waited for external intervention by the
European Commission or the European Court of Justice to "force" them into
compliance with European standards.
Belgium
In Belgium parental leave did not exist in the private sector, whereas it had been
known for a long time in the public sector (Interview B6: 82-137; Interview EU1:
293-319). Only a 10-day leave for urgent reasons such as hospitalization, accident
or sickness of persons living under the same roof was regulated by the convention
collective de travail N° 45 (CCT, national collective agreement). [34] Therefore in
legal terms misfit was almost 100 percent (for private employees), or as one
interview partner put it "we had to start at zero" (Interview B1: 570-570,
translation by M.H.).
The degree of practical misfit was clearly more moderate. Since the mid-1980s,
collective agreements often ensured parental leave (Interview B6: 82-137) and, de
facto, parental leave was taken under the so-called scheme d'interruption de
carrière (IDC, sabbatical). This scheme had been introduced on January 22, 1985,
at the suggestion of Mrs Miet Smet, who later became Minister for Labor and
Social Affaires when the EU Directive was adopted and transposed into Belgian
law. Under the general IDC, all workers in the private sector can stop working or
reduce their working hours for three to twelve months while receiving part of their
monthly salary and being entitled to return to their job afterwards. However, the
right to take such an interruption de carrière depends on the employer's agreement
- unless there is a more favorable collective agreement in the enterprise - and
requires replacement by an unemployed person. [35] Thus to comply with the
provisions of the EU Directive important changes were necessary.
The required adaptation has taken place in time. [36] In Belgium now, all workers
have the individual right to take three months' leave to educate their natural or
adopted children under four years of age. During the leave period, they are
protected against dismissal and their acquired rights are maintained. Following the
soft-law aspects of the Directive, the right to leave is non-transferable and theleave may be taken not only on a full-time basis, but also part-time or in a
piecemeal form. It could be argued that some of the standards - such as protection
against dismissal or the right to return to a similar job - are not new in a
qualitative sense since they have been practiced under the general IDC leave
before. In addition, it should be noted that the reform mainly meant a change of
instruments, since parental leave de facto was often assured by collective
agreements even before the transposition by law.
Thus, Belgium seems to be an example where correct and timely transposition
took place, even though misfit was considerable. [37] This is even more
remarkable since in the 1980s, when the European Commission had first proposed
a Directive on parental leave, the Christian democratic-liberal (CVP-PRL)
coalition government in Belgium blocked the proposal along with the UK. In
1993, however, it was the Socialist Belgian Minister Miet Smet who, during the
presidency of her country, reopened discussion of the long-dormant parental leave
Directive and became a promoter of the issue: "We took the proposal out of the
fridge, we wanted to open the debate again and we put a lot of work into it"
(Interview B6: 38-47, translation by M.H., see also above). But even if support for
the introduction of parental leave in Belgium is obvious, which is remarkable in
light of the significant misfit that needed to be overcome, the story is more
complicated. The transposition of the parental leave Directive led to severe
quarrels between national actors over the question of who should be the one to
implement the Directive.
After the adoption of the European Directive, Minister Smet envisaged
transposition by adding a special sub-scheme devoted to parental leave to the IDC.
At the same time, the social partners in the National Labor Council had started
negotiating on the transposition of the EU Directive and adopted CCT N° 64 on
April 29, 1997. However, they could not assure payment or continuity of social
security benefits since this was outside their remit. That the social partners still
went ahead with the transposition of the Directive by CCT even against the will of
the government has to be seen in the context of the fact that the Directive was the
first to stem from European-level social partner negotiations. It is important to
note that the Belgian government supported the European social partner
negotiations, because of the form of the negotiations. Social partner agreements
with erga omnes application, giving social partners a quasi-legislative function,
are well known in Belgium. Therefore, Belgians were proud to export the national
model to the European level (Interview B5: 265-280). Minister Smet was for
personal and competence reasons attached to a transposition via a sub-scheme of
the IDC. [38] "The minister did not want to introduce a right to take parental
leave, but to integrate it into the existing sabbatical scheme, albeit with allowance,
and the social partners wanted to create a new right, but they could not provide for
allowance without the agreement of the minister" (Interview B9: 296-325,
translation by M.H.).
The result is a confusing coexistence of two versions of parental leave. Even
though they are similar, some relevant differences exist: the CCT guarantees a
right for parental leave even in SMEs, but financing is not assured. Parental leave
under the IDC scheme is financed, but can only be taken if the person has not
taken parental leave under the CCT 64. Owing to these two parallel schemes, the
legal situation remains unclear, and debates about the prevalence of one of the
schemes continue. It should be noted that transposition via one of the schemeswould have been sufficient. The quarrels are not due to the Directive, but can
nevertheless only be explained in its context.
France
In France almost no misfit existed at the time of adoption of the European
Directive in Brussels. The general principle of parental leave financed by a state
allowance (APE, allocation parental d'éducation) had for a long time been
established in the Code du Travail (L 122-28). Some national standards even
provided for a significantly higher protection level. For example, parental leave
could be extended to a total of 36 months. This was partly due to the fact that two
years before the Directive was adopted at the European level a new national law
on the family was adopted. [39] Taking into account the fact that at this point the
discussion in Brussels had already been under way for some years, it is not
surprising that some of the newly introduced changes covered standards which the
Directive would otherwise have required to be adopted. Most importantly, the
right to parental leave was extended to SMEs with less than 100 workers.
Previously, parental leave in these enterprises had depended upon the decision of
the employer after consultation with the comité d'entreprise (works council).
Parental leave also became an individual right in 1995.
This picture fits in well with the broad support found amongst national actors,
ranging from the militant trade union federation Force Ouvrière (Interview F3:
206-208) and public sector unions (Interview F9: 146-178) to employers'
representatives (Interview F2: 125-233) and ministry officials (Interview F7: 145-
289). The underlying tenor in all interviews was that even employer
representatives seem convinced that European social policy is good because "the
European Directives do not disturb the French game, they do not pose any
problems because we already have our Labor Code" (Interview F2: 125-233,
translation by M.H.).
As to leave for urgent family reasons, a statutory entitlement for all employees to
time off with pay for family reasons such as marriage, birth or adoption, or death
existed at the time the Directive was adopted, but this did not include sickness
(EIRR 263: 24). In addition, since 1995 exceptional leave has been allowed in
cases of accident or for the care of sick children under 16 - but this scheme does
not include care for older children or other family members. Even if it is difficult
to argue that this change was caused exclusively by the ongoing European debate
over the parental leave Directive, interference seems likely. Hence, this reform
may well have been enacted in anticipation of the coming European measure. In
any case, misfit remained with regard to leave for reasons like caring for older
children or other family members, or in cases of sickness. Initially, however, these
shortcomings were not eliminated by a reform of the existing schemes - inertia
prevailed. Change did not take place until later when it was in the interest of the
Jospin government to further improve the situation for employees who wanted to
take leave for urgent family reasons. The remaining misfit with the European
Directive will also have played its role. At the end of 2000, new leave for seriously
ill children was established. [40] This leave is paid and thus the new law
guarantees a more favorable regulation than prior national standards, and even
exceeds the requirements of the Directive. But there is still no provision for
parents to take leave in order to care for a sick partner or relative, and thus someof the requirements of the Directive still have not been met. So far the
Commission has not taken any steps to correct this, maybe because the
formulation of the standard in the EU Directive is very loose and diverging
interpretations are possible according to the national point of view.
The non-binding provisions did not play any role in the French transposition of the
Directive (Interview F7: 313-331). In the first few years, no transposition took
place at all. This inertia seems to be due to the fact that there was only very
limited misfit in France. At the time the Directive was adopted, adaptational
pressure was only small, partly because changes had been anticipated in an earlier
national reform. Under such circumstances it would certainly have been
inconvenient for government to risk triggering a new debate and become involved
in possible conflicts just to change some marginal details of the law and possibly
include some of the soft-law provisions.
Spain
In Spain two different types of parental leave existed before the Directive was
adopted in Brussels: 12 months' parental leave to take care of children with the
possibility of extending this (excedencia por cuidado de hijo) and an entitlement
to working time reduction for guardianship (guarda legal) - which is de facto an
equivalent to part-time parental leave. Protection against dismissal was provided,
but only in constitutional form as a general clause against any discriminatory
dismissal (Interview E4: 632-840). The Spanish regulation on leave for urgent
family reasons included cases of birth, serious illness and death of relatives up to
second degree of consanguinity and kinship, without any age restriction. Even if
Spanish law showed a broad understanding of family, accidents were not
considered a reason for taking urgent leave (Castro Argüelles 1998: 913). Last but
not least, it should be mentioned that, in cases where both parents worked, Article
46.3 of the Estatuto de los Trabajadores (ET) granted parental leave to the father
and to the mother, but simultaneous leave was not possible. However, the principle
of parental leave as an individual right was not contradicted by this regulation.
There was consent amongst interview partners from the ministry, employers'
organizations and trade unions that the degree of misfit at the time of adoption was
small (Interview E4: 618-623; Interview E2: 831-835; Interview E1: 1087-1099).
Thus existing national rules were considered largely sufficient to comply with the
European Directive (Interview E4: 632-840). National actors were reluctant to
take action over the remaining details - especially since misfit seemed contingent
on interpretation. This explains the initial inertia.
In the context of the transposition of the EC pregnant workers Directive, [41] the
European Commission had made it clear that the constitutional granting of
protection against dismissal was not sufficient to comply with the requirements of
European standards. Therefore, Spain saw itself forced to revise the legislation on
maternity leave so as to introduce explicit protection against dismissal
(Commission of the European Communities 1999: 14). The conservative
government used this opportunity to clarify simultaneously the existing
uncertainties over protection against dismissal during parental leave and the list of
grounds on which leave for urgent family reasons could be taken. The individual
right clause was also revised and now definitely ensures the standard of the EUDirective (Interview E4: 632-840). [42] Once the stimulus for a wider reform had
been given, transposition of the parental leave Directive was quickly incorporated
into a broader reform law, and adaptation finally took place after a delay of a year
and a half.
Non-binding recommendations seem in Spain to be generally considered "extras"
for which trade union representatives have to fight in collective agreements
(Interview E1: 1225-1233, 1201-1205). Non-compulsory standards of the EU
parental leave Directive did not enter into statutory law. Despite intensive lobbying
by trade unions to extend the law (Law 39/99) to include the possibility of taking
parental leave until the child is 8 years old, the age limit remained 6 years
(Interview E1: 1225-1233; Interview E8: 288-291).
Greece
An entitlement to three months unpaid parental leave existed in Greece since 1984
(Law 1483/1984), [43] but this law limited employees' leave for childcare to
enterprises with more than 100 workers. In 1993, a national collective agreement
had lowered the threshold number of employees to 50 and extended the duration to
3.5 months. Thus, in June 1996, when the Directive was adopted at EU level, the
right to parental leave was still restricted to workers in enterprises with more than
50 employees (Koukiadis 1997: 387; Clauwaert/Harger 2000:45). Since the first
introduction of parental leave, the right to take leave also applied to cases of
adoption, and protection against dismissal was guaranteed. The right to return to a
similar job existed (Interview GR2: 232-364) and acquired rights were maintained
(Koukiadis 1997: 388). However, the right to take parental leave was only granted
to workers whose spouses worked outside the family household, similar to the
rules in Germany and Austria (International Labour Office 1994: 333; Koukiadis
1997: 387-388). Such an exclusion of certain employees from the parental leave
entitlement was not in line with the Directive.
The scope of parental leave rights was enlarged by Law 2639/98 [44] and the
company-size threshold was also abandoned. Now all workers in both public and
private-sector enterprises are entitled to parental leave. Thus implementation was
secured in time even if this broader labor law is not considered by national experts
to be a transposition of the EU Directive. The Commission has initiated the first
step of an infringement proceeding for non-notification, but apparently no further
action has been taken.
It seems that misfit remains since parental leave is still not an individual right and
provision has been made for the employer to refuse parental leave to his or her
employees if more than 8 percent of the workforce ask for leave in the same year.
Applications are dealt with on a "first come, first served" basis. This is not related
to the size of the enterprise and it is not specified how long the leave may be
postponed (Interview GR14). In combination with the child's age limit up to which
the leave can be taken, this can ultimately lead to a de facto refusal by the
employer (International Labour Office 1994:333; Koukiadis 1997: 387;
Clauwaert/Harger 2000:45). So far, however, no practical difficulties have been
reported.
In sum, misfit was considerable in legal terms and this has great relevance inpractice, since there are many SME enterprises in Greece which were not covered
before. With regard to the principles, most standards had already been secured for
the smaller field of application. Since the government did not make any
adjustments to the substantive standards guaranteed by law, it is no surprise that
the recommendations of the Directive have not found their way into Greek
legislation. Pressure from national actors to improve the conditions under which
leave can be taken would have been needed to initiate a reform process. Such
pressure is absent since societal interest in these conditions remains low as long as
take-up numbers are low - and this is mainly due to a lack of adequate financial
support (Interview GR2: 232-364).
Portugal
Prior to the implementation of the Directive, parental leave existed as an
employee's right to take 6 months "special leave" for children under three years.
Prolongation of this unpaid leave was possible up to 24 months (Interview P1:
1727-1745, Wollmann 1999: 89). Leave on the grounds of adoption was also
possible if the adopted child was under three years old. But this special leave did
not guarantee all the rights required by the European Directive. Even if both
mothers and fathers could take the leave, interview partners claimed that the right
was not individual (Interview P8: 770-815, see also Pinto et al. 1997: 578). In
addition, it seems that no explicit protection against dismissal existed for parental
leave, nor was the return to a similar job legally assured. [45] Regarding leave for
urgent family reasons, there was no misfit since an entitlement to a maximum of
15 days' leave in order take care of any family member in cases of sickness or
accident was guaranteed, and if the child was younger, the leave was even longer
(Interview P1: 1788-1851).
Misfit was in overall terms medium and small in practical relevance, [46] but the
changes that took place with the transposition law No. 142/99 [47] are even more
considerable since they exceed the binding standards of the European Directive.
National experts argued that "the Directive imposed almost no modifications to the
existing law, and we only modified it in order to make the social partner
agreement visible" (Interview P1: 2162-2169, translation by M.H.).
A so-called parental-leave scheme has recently been introduced. Without
replacing the special leave, it simply adds the right to another type of leave.
Parents can now be absent from work for three months to take care of their
children. Once this parental leave has been used, parents can still take the "old"
special childcare leave for another two years. At first sight, this coexistence seems
to be a confusing duplication of provision instead of proper integration. On closer
inspection, however, the coexistence might be explained with reference to the non-
regression clause, which does not allow a lowering of prior standards when
transposing European Directives. The "new" parental leave is an individual and
non-transferable right but only for three months (Clauwaert/Harger 2000:75,
Interview P8: 44-56). The "old" right allows for more leave, but not as an
individual and non-transferable right. Portugal did not introduce the new benefits
for the special leave under the old regulation, but limited them to a shorter time
period required by the Directive. Nevertheless if the "old" right would have been
cancelled, the standard of six months' leave would have been lowered to three
months, something not allowed when transposing EU Directives.Adaptation was delayed by a year and a half. [48] The 17th Report on the
Application of Community Law reveals that there was an infringement procedure
of the Commission against Portugal (1998/0441) which was suspended on
December 22, 1999, shortly after the transposition legislation entered into force.
National adaptation did not only successfully tackle the misfit, but also showed
itself to be creative in using the Directive to address specific national problems,
such as teenage pregnancy, by the introduction of grandparents' leave (Interview
P8: 770-815). In addition, the age limit for adopted children was raised, and the
new law fosters a role change to improve female participation on the labor market
by introducing 15 days' paternity leave with pay. Thus, Portugal is a case where
stalemate would have been likely according to the misfit hypothesis, while the
actual Portuguese reaction shows that, even with relevant misfit, proper
implementation and even over-implementation is possible. In this context, it
should be noted that law No. 142/99 along with other amendments to law No. 4/84
were part of the 1996-1999 Acordo de Concertação Estratégica, a strategic,
tripartite social pact. Thus consensus amongst national actors on problem
definition and solutions existed.
4 Conclusions: EC Standards and Misfit in the Member States
The above analysis of the EC's 1996 parental leave Directive and its
implementation in the 15 member states sheds new light on the discussion of EC
social standards (see 1 below) and of implementation quality determinants (see 2
below).
1. By the time of its adoption, many have argued that, the importance of the
parental leave agreement lay in its existence rather than its substance. The
symbolic importance of a first collective agreement at the EU level to prove that
the corporatist procedures of the Maastricht Social Agreement could be
operational was indeed great. At the same time, many scholars criticized the fact
that the agreed minimum standards were low (for example, see Keller/Sörries
1997; 1999). Specialist journals such as the European Industrial Relations Review
(EIRR) highlighted above all that the minimum three months of parental leave
represented the shortest time allotted in any of the countries with a statutory right
to parental leave, i.e. in Greece. One had the impression that legal changes would
only be required in a very small number of countries. Concerning urgent family
leave on grounds of force majeure, the parental leave agreement's provisions were
initially thought to improve the status quo only in Ireland and the UK (the latter
originally being outside its remit) (EIRR 263: 23).
An in-depth-evaluation, by contrast, must take into consideration the relevant
background of the parental leave agreement at both the European and the national
levels. First, the realistic point of comparison for the provisions of the agreement
(which was incorporated in the Council Directive) is with the original Commission
proposal (which itself had not recommended particularly far-reaching standards)
and with the various compromise texts that had been discussed in the Social
Council briefly before the Social Agreement was employed as a new legal basis
(see also Dølvik 1997; Falkner 1998; Hartenberger 2001). The latter were even
lower in standard than the collective agreement.Second, and most importantly here, a study of the practical effects in the member
states is needed if we are to properly assess the impact of the agreement. The
empirical study summarized in this paper reveals that, in fact, adaptational
pressure was created in all 15 member states. Although the overall economic
impact of the Directive in terms of the costs to (private and public) employers was
rather modest (in particular, compared to Directives in other policy areas [49] ),
every single country had to change its rules. While policy misfit was rather small
in Finland, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, the other member
states needed significant adaptation of either the qualitative kind (turning parental
leave into an individual right of every employee, male and female alike, without
any general need for the employer's consent) or the quantitative kind (e.g.
including important categories of the workforce, such as employees working in
SMEs or private-sector employees, in the existing leave schemes). Denmark is a
particular case, since the implementation of the Directive only required limited
adaptation in policy terms, but with high probability will call for the introduction
of generally binding legislation instead of autonomous regulation by the social
partners, thereby challenging the established relationship between the state and the
social partners. Even in the absence of a final assessment of the parental leave
Directive's standards, [50] one should underline the fact that the number of
changes actually required certainly surpasses scholarly expectations.
Furthermore, almost half of all the member states went beyond the European
minimum requirements when transposing the Directive. Minor (but still
significant) cases of over-implementation could be observed in France, Ireland,
and the Netherlands, while the reforms enacted in Austria, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, and Luxembourg were considerably more favorable than the Directive
envisaged.
2. What theoretical lessons can be drawn from the way the 15 member states have
implemented the parental leave Directive? On the one hand, some of our cases
conform well to the view suggested by misfit-oriented scholars. For example,
Finland and Sweden both had to cope with very little adaptational pressure and
did not encounter any problems in fine-tuning their existing schemes so as to fully
comply with the requirements of the Directive.
On the other hand, however, several cases are completely at odds with the misfit
hypothesis. In Spain and France, only very little change was required.
Nevertheless, transposition came considerably late. In both countries, it was the
small amount of misfit itself that caused problems. Spanish officials originally
argued that no changes were required at all, and only acknowledged the existence
of adaptational pressure after the Commission had taken action against Spain's
rules against dismissal in the context of the pregnant workers Directive. Similarly,
the French administration for a long time considered its existing rules and
regulations as basically sufficient and therefore saw no point in initiating a time-
consuming legislative reform process only to effect some detailed fine-tuning
without any real impact. The converse is true for Luxembourg. Here, the existence
of considerable adaptational pressure had a positive effect on implementation
performance. While Luxembourg is often plagued by considerable delays in
transposing European Directives, the government in this case managed to adjust in
an unusually fast and smooth way. Under conditions of permanent administrative
overload, Directives requiring more important changes are apt to be treated with
higher priority than measures which demand only minor changes. In addition, theLuxembourg and Irish cases stress the importance of administrative capabilities
and resources for implementation performance. Although the relevance of this
causal condition was already acknowledged in the first comprehensive study on
implementing European Community legislation (Siedentopf/Ziller 1988a; 1988b),
the insights gained by this pioneer analysis do not receive the attention they should
in recent debates.
Additionally, we have found a number of more ambiguous transposition patterns,
displaying affirmative as well as conflicting features. The UK and Ireland were
both forced to introduce completely new legislation and thus had to cope with
rather high degrees of adaptational pressure. At first sight, the incorrect
transposition of the Directive, which could only be remedied after interventions by
the Commission and the European Court, seems to match the predictions of the
misfit-oriented view. It is nevertheless surprising that both governments were
firmly committed to implementing the Directive (whose standards they would
certainly not have chosen autonomously for their country in the absence of an EU
Directive) and managed to transpose the central parts within the given deadline.
Both cases underline the importance of political willingness on the part of
governments, but they also stress the relevance of interest group pressure. Such
pressure may not only be beneficial to implementation, but may also force
governments to indulge in non-compliant behavior. In the two cases in question,
both transpired: union pressure helped speedy transposition while employer
opposition made the British and Irish governments try (in vain) to get away with
an illegal cut-off date.
The role in timely implementation of specific government agendas, and in
particular of the partisan composition of government, is also underlined by the
German case. The conservative-liberal government refused to revise the existing
legislation since the changes were at odds with the government's conservative
preferences on family policy as expressed in the laws in force. Adaptation only
took place after the Social Democrats had assumed power and chose to
fundamentally overhaul the old legislation according to their more egalitarian
views on family policy. The German case also demonstrates that the partisan
composition of government is important for the fate of soft-law provisions. Some
of the non-binding recommendations were indeed taken into account by the new
act because they were amenable to the political aspirations of the left-wing
government.
A further pattern concealed by an exclusive focus on policy misfit is the role
played by issue linkage and over-implementation or gold-plating (i.e.
implementation exceeding the Directive's binding standards). Thus, the Austrian
case shows that implementation delays may also be due to debates about the way
soft-law provisions should be reflected in the national rules. In Italy, transposition
was also late because the implementation of the Directive was coupled with a
comprehensive review of the legislation on maternity leave and of other issues
related to greater compatibility of work and family life.
To sum up, the empirical results presented in this paper cast doubts on the
theoretical usefulness of focusing too much on matches or mismatches between
European policies and domestic structures. We have shown that a very low degree
of misfit may sometimes even be a problem rather than a condition for success
and that a considerable misfit may under certain conditions even be conducive tosmooth implementation. In addition, several member states not only eliminated the
misfit created by the Directive, but raised their domestic standards above the
European minimum requirements. While the degree of misfit indeed may be an
important condition for determining implementation success or failure, our
analysis suggests that a more open theoretical approach which takes into account
both institutional and actor-based factors, such as the framework of actor-centered
institutionalism (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; see also Scharpf 1997), may be a more
promising starting point. Adding to the insights gained by scholars like Héritier et
al. (2001) and Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso (2001), we have demonstrated
that national context variables are crucial for an understanding of implementation
processes, and we have highlighted the impact of interest group pressure,
administrative capabilities, party politics, issue linkage, and gold-plating.
Further research will be needed to determine the relative weight of each of these
factors and to complement this picture with implementation studies on many more
Directives. [51] What is certain at this stage is that our analysis reveals a much
more dynamic relationship between European rules and domestic adaptation
strategies than has been suggested by misfit-oriented scholars hitherto.
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Notes
1
We would like to thank Matthias Mahlmann, Pavel Ovseiko, and Ingeborg
Tömmel for their very helpful comments.
2
The major exception is Héritier et al. (2001).
3
The few publications on the effects of the parental leave Directive that exist so far
either focused solely on some member states (Hartenberger 2001: 139-151) or
provided no more than a rough assessment of its practical implications, based on
secondary sources (Hardy/Adnett 2002). Thus, our study is the first to offer
comparable findings from first-hand empirical investigations in all 15 member
states.
4
In an attempt to systematize the different understandings suggested in the literature
(see above), we break down the concept of fit or misfit between European
requirements and domestic structures into four dimensions. First and foremost, we
look at policy misfit, i.e. the extent to which existing policies have to be reformed
in order to fulfill the European standards, taking into account both legal changes
and their de facto relevance (which may be diminished by pre-existing collective
agreements or workplace practices). Second, implementing a Directive may
require administrative reforms, such as the creation of new agencies or the
assignment of additional tasks or resources to existing administrative entities.
Third, implementation can demand changes to the relationship between the state
and interest groups, e.g. by necessitating state intervention in an area which
traditionally is regulated autonomously by the social partners. Finally, the
economic cost implications of these changes, both for the state and for private
employers, have to be taken into account. In order to classify different degrees of
adaptational pressure and compare them between the member states, we use a
threefold scheme (low, medium, and high degrees of misfit).
5
At one point, a lowest-common-denominator solution seems to have emerged: the
UK wished parental leave to be only granted to mothers, not to fathers.
Reportedly, only the Irish delegation and the Commission were immediately
against this "awful" change (as one Commission official described it in aninterview), which made the Commission threaten to bring in the ECJ against this
discrimination on grounds of sex.
6
The Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe.
7
The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation.
8
The European Trade Union Confederation.
9
There was unanimous agreement. Adoption was, however, postponed with a view
to parliamentary approval in Germany (Agence Europe March 30, 1996: 7).
10
Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on
parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and ETUC (OJ L 145, June 19, 1996,
4-9).
11
Since the conservative British government had secured an opt-out from the
European Treaty's social chapter at the Maastricht summit (EIRR 216: 2), the UK
was initially not covered by the Directive. Tony Blair's Labour government, which
had assumed power in May 1997, signed up to the social chapter and declared its
willingness to implement the Directives that had been enacted during the UK's
opt-out (EIRR, 282: 2; EIRR 284: 2). As a consequence, the UK's transposition
deadline was later than the one applying to the other member states. The UK had
to comply with the Directive by December 15, 1999.
12
This means that a situation where the mother must refrain from her right to
parental leave in order to allow the father to take it, as previously practiced in
several countries, is not consistent with the agreement.
13
Maternity Protection Act, dated April 17, 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 221/1979,
as amended up to version Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 833/1992; Act concerning
parental leave, dated September 9, 1989, Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 651/1989, as
amended up to version Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 833/1992.
14
Maternity Protection Act, dated April 17, 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 221/1979,
as amended up to version Bundesgesetzblatt I, No. 153/1999; Act concerning
parental leave, dated September 9, 1989, Bundesgesetzblatt, No. 651/1989, as
amended up to version Bundesgesetzblatt I, No. 153/1999.
15
The correctness of the transposition measures enacted in 1999 has recently been
questioned by the European Commission. The Commission claims that the new
regulation concerning the individual right still includes a very slight advantage for
the mother vis-à-vis the father (Interview A2b). If this turns out to be true, our
argument will be strengthened, for then the transposition - despite the small misfit
- will not have only been delayed, but also incorrect.16
For example the possibility of taking at least parts of the leave until the child is 8
or the option to take leave on a part-time basis.
17
See Article 137 (ex Article 118) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community.
18
See, for example, judgment of the Court of 30 January 1985. Commission of the
European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark. Equal pay for men and women.
Case 143/83.
19
The best-known example is the transposition of the Directive (Council Directive
93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organization of
working time, OJ L 307, December 13, 1993, 18-24) in Denmark (EIRR 315: 4,
Jørgensen 2001).
20
Act concerning the creation of a parental leave and a leave for family reasons,
dated February 12, 1999, Mémorial Series A, 1999, p. 189.
21
From the six labor law Directives our project is studying, this is the only Directive
which was transposed in time by Luxembourg.
22
Act No. 1204 concerning the protection of working mothers, dated December 30,
1971, Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 14/1972.
23
Act No. 53 concerning dispositions for the support of maternity and paternity, the
right to care and education and the co-ordination of city times, dated March 8,
2000, Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 60/2000.
24
Bundesgesetzblatt I, 1994, p. 180.
25
Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2000, p. 1645.
26
Wet van het ouderschapsverlof, Staatsblad 1990, 560.
27
These data are based on a definition of part-time work which comprises all
employees working less than 35 hours a week (Visser 1999: 286). Thus, the
proportion of employees with a weekly working time of less than 20 hours will be
lower than 35 percent.
28
Wet van 25 juni 1997 tot wijziging van titel 7.10 (arbeidsovereenkomst) van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek met betrekking tot het ouderschapsverlof, Staatsblad 1997,
266.29
According to government estimates, the annual costs of implementing the working
time Directive, which required the introduction of the 48-hour week and an
entitlement to four weeks annual leave, amounted to 1.9 billion pounds or some
3.1 billion euro (DTI 1998b: Annex 3). The national minimum wage legislation
that came into effect in April 1999 had estimated annual costs of 2.5 billion
pounds (about 4.1 billion euro, see DTI 1998a: Annex 5).
30
The Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/3312, came
into force on December 15, 1999, which was exactly the date on which the
implementation period ended.
31
The Maternity and Parental Leave (Amendment) Regulations 2001, S.I. No. 4010,
2001, which came into effect on January 10, 2002.
32
The Parental Leave Act, 1998 (1998, No. 30), was adopted on July 8, 1998, and
came into force on December 3, 1998.
33
The text of the Reasoned Opinion issued by the European Commission against
Ireland is reprinted in Clauwaert/Herger (2000: 117-118).
34
The convention collective de travail N° 45, of December 19, 1989, which
established the principle of leave for urgent reasons, was ratified by arrêté royal of
March 6, 1990 (Moniteur Belge of March 21, 1990). In Belgium the social
partners can negotiate national collective agreements in the Conseil National du
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Law N° 2000-1257 on the financing of social security of December 23, 2000, p.
20558. Journal Officiel N° 171, December 24, 2000. The law came into force on
January 1, 2001. Allowing families to deal with accidents and sickness, the leave
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Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures
to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers
and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual
Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L
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still not guaranteed (Clauwaert/Harger 2000: 9 and 77), this claim seems to rest on
an overtly legalistic interpretation. Although there is no explicit legal transposition,
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(Interview P1: 1788-1851).
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December 1, 1999. The law is the 4th amendment to law 4/84 on the protection of
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Only on this broader basis can we hope in the future to judge the extent to which
national social policies are transformed through EU Directives. For an outline of
our ongoing project and intermediate results, see
<http://www.mpifg.de/fo/multilevel_en.html#Proj5.>
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